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Abstract: In the paper, alternative contractual arrangements between crop producers and processors are 
evaluated with a view of addressing the major issues present in peanut markets in the U.S., the major EU 
supplier of high quality peanuts. The issues are the thinness of the spot markets and the absence of quality 
premiums, both of which impair market efficiency. Results indicate that introducing contracts with a 
system of quality differentials creates incentives for producer self-selection to participate in the post-
harvest cash market. Moreover, in the presence of sufficiently high common production risk, tournament 
contracts are more efficient and preferred by the producers than the standard fixed premium schedules.  
 
 






In the paper, we investigate the efficiency and welfare effects of the contractual structure in the 
U.S. markets for quality differentiated raw agricultural produce that are supported by the Marketing 
Assistance Loan Program, as both characteristics have important implications for efficiency and welfare. 
In particular, we focus on the markets for commodities that, until 2002, were regulated by supply 
management policies in the form of the quota system that fixed both the prices and quantities and paid 
little attention for encouraging production of optimal/efficient quality. These commodities are sugar, 
tobacco, and peanuts. As a relevant example, we consider the U.S. peanut market. The subject may also 
prove interesting to the European audience, as the U.S. is the largest supplier of high quality peanuts to 
the EU. 
The actual markets for peanuts in the U.S., as of today, are dominated by producer-processor 
contracts that support the observed absence of post-harvest cash/spot markets and do not encourage 
socially beneficial improvement in quality by provide almost no quality differentials/premiums. Yet, 
unlike many other staple crops (wheat, soybeans, and corn) peanuts are highly differentiated in quality, 
which is confirmed by their international, particularly European, trade patterns (Revoredo and Fletcher, 
2003). In an attempt to address these issues, we model the efficiency and distributional effects of 
introduction of two types of alternative contractual arrangements between crop growers and processors: 
fixed quality premium and tournament contracts. The main results are that introducing contracts with a 
system of quality differentials creates incentives for producer self-selection to participate in the post-
harvest cash market. Moreover, in the presence of sufficiently high common production risk, tournament 
contracts are more efficient and preferred by the producers than the standard fixed premium schedules. 
In what follows, we describe the Marketing Loan Program Operation and current marketing 
issues in more detail using peanuts as a concrete example, present a model of introduction of quality 
differentials, and discuss the results.  
 
 
Legislative Background and Identification of the Issues 
 
The 2002 Farm Act eliminated the price and quantity fixing marketing quota system that, 
although with several modifications, was the core of the support of the peanut (since 1933) and other crop 
production. The quota system was replaced by a Marketing Assistance Loan Program (MLP) under which producers can get a government loan at a pre-determined Marketing Loan Rate (MLR) of US$ 355 per 
short ton by pledging their crop as collateral.
1 During the term of the loan (9 months) producers can either 
forfeit the loan or repay it at the lesser of the Loan Repayment Rate (LRR) plus interest or the USDA-set 
repayment rate. Producers may repay the loan at a rate that is the lesser of: (1) USDA-determined loan 
repayment rate (LRR) or (2) the marketing loan rate (MLR) plus interest. Alternatively, farmers can 
forfeit the loan. Producers that do not take the marketing loan are entitled to a so-called deficiency 
payment that equals the difference between the loan rate and the repayment rate.
2  
The official purpose of setting the loan repayment rate is to "minimize potential loan forfeitures 
and storage costs, and to promote competitive marketing of peanuts both domestically and 
internationally." In a perfectly competitive and efficient market, setting the loan repayment rate equal to 
the current spot market price would meet these goals (Westcott and Price, 2001). However, without a spot 
market to use as a reference for crop prices, setting the repayment rate becomes a moot point. This may 
be reflected in Mr. Spearman’s (2004) comment that “USDA gives no reasoning for leaving rates [the 
repayment rate] at loan level. The industry thought the process would be more transparent, hoping for 
brief weekly explanations” (the Peanut Grower bulletin, Jan/2004, 
http://www.peanutgrower.com/home/2004_JanMarketWatch.html). 
  Under the 1996 Farm Act
3, the groundnut program was a two-tier price support program, with 
groundnut production destined to food products limited to an annually established quota designed to 
uphold prices fixed at US$ 610 per short ton. Above quota groundnut production was destined for the 
export or the domestic crushing market (oil and meal) and, in 2001, it was eligible for a support price of 
only US$ 132 per short ton. Thus, peanut marketing was a very regulated activity, with farmers disposing 
their peanuts almost at harvest either by contracting them for export or crush, selling them as part of the 
marketing quota, or pledging them to the CCC to receive the support price for additional peanuts. It goes 
without saying that this system prevented the formation of a spot/cash market for peanuts since the 
harvest was allocated through contracts (for export or crush) or through the CCC marketing quota 
program. 
  
As a result of the above described policy change, and the industry’s reaction to it, two major 
issues that are dealt with in this paper emerged: 
 
Issue 1 
During the first year of the 2002 Farm Act, two marketing contract types have been observed in 
peanut markets: "Delivery at Harvest" (DAH) and the "Option-to-Purchase" (OTP). While the DAH is a 
typical forward contract with delivery at harvest time, the OTP contract is a hybrid of a forward and an 
option contract.
4 The OTP contract gives the buyer (i.e., peanut sheller) an exclusive right but not an 
obligation to purchase a certain volume of the crop from the farmer. A peculiarity of this OTP is that, 
while in other markets the selling price is tied to either spot market price or to a basis (when futures 
markets exist), the OTP price base is the USDA-determined repayment rate. 
As a result, the U.S. peanut markets are suffering from the lack of spot market transactions, which 
are beneficial from the point of view of economic efficiency (as is well known, spot markets result in 
efficient equilibration of supply and demand). This lack of spot markets has been explained by the 
absence of incentives for the producers to move their crop from the loan program and sell it for cash to 
the processors when the market prices are below the MLR. This happens because the program is so 
                                                 
1 Other produces eligible for the MLP include wheat, corn, barley, oats, cotton, rice, soybeans, other oilseeds, wool, 
mohair, honey, lentils, and chickpeas. 
2 For a thorough review of the 2002 Farm Act and its commodity market implications, see Westcott, Young, and 
Price (2002).  
3 For a background about the evolution of the US peanut program see Rucker and Thurman (1990). 
4 Sykuta and Purcell (2003) report similar type of contracts for soybeans, in their paper OTP contracts are called 
“Buyer’s call” designed that it guarantees the producers the MLR even if the crop is never redeemed from the program. 
Not only is this situation detrimental to the economic efficiency of free spot markets, but it also 
invalidates the marketing loan repayment rate setting mechanism, which presumes that the repayment 
rates are set equal to the current spot market prices. This has led to much confusion among the crowers 
and crop processors, who both complained about the lack of transparency and in the repayment rate 
setting and market distortions resulting from it (Dohlman et al., 2004). This situation is also likely to raise 
the program costs bourn by the taxpayers.  
 
Issue 2 
Peanuts are distinguished for being more heterogeneous than the majority of other crops. Not 
only there are many peanut varieties, but their individual quality characteristics also differ significantly 
depending on the growing conditions and producer managerial effort. Poor crop management and lack of 
irrigation lead to increased levels of aflatoxin (a health threatening toxin for which the EU maintains very 
strict standards) and pre- or over-mature harvesting that impairs the crop’s taste and processing qualities.  
However, as a legacy of the previous supply management polices that did not differentiate the products 
according to their quality, no well-defined system of quality premiums exists in current markets, as well 
as in contracts between crop growers and processors. As a result, producers of vastly different crop 
qualities are paid the same price (unless they receive something extra unofficially for selling to a 
particular processor). This situation has already raised concerns by the farmers and processors equally, as 
there is an apparent need to encourage quality in production.  
It is worth mentioning that, while there may be some exceptions to the situation described above, 





For simplicity and illustrative purposes, we assume the simplest settings in the model below. 
However, the generality of the conclusions is not violated by introducing more complicated/realistic 
assumptions.
5 
  There is a two-period game in which competitive crop processors present growers with a contract 
scheme that offers specific quality premiums, and then the growers decide how much quality they want to 
produce by exercising costly effort and making specific investments. The crop processors are assumed to 
be perfectly competitive (which implies zero profits) and risk-averse. It is also assumed that the only 
processing input is the crop, that there are no economies of scale in processing and 1:1 conversion 
coefficient, and that the demand for quality of the processing output is perfectly inelastic and pays P per 
unit of quality (which, in case of peanuts, is mainly their aflatoxin content). The processors can observe 
the crop quality but can not ascertain the extent to which it is due to the grower effort/expenditure or 
random factors, such as weather and land/soil quality.  
The growers are identical and maximize expected utility of net income and are risk averse. For 
simplicity, we abstract from the volume of crop production by assuming constant costs per unit of weight. 
Instead, we focus on the crop quality of grower i, qi, which is a result of the level of effort/investment, xi 
(a measure of time and managerial effort put into monitoring the crop and making timely decisions), an 
idiosyncratic (producer-specific) random variable ei ~ (0,σe
2) that is i.i.d. across the producers (weed 
infestation, decease, etc.), and a common random  component v~ (0,σv
2) uncorrelated with e, which 
reflects common yield-related risks (weather, desease, etc.): 
  qi = xi + ei + v 
                                                 
5 The models borrow from the old but elegant models of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and Stokey (1983), but 
are modified and applied to a different market setup, which leads to quite different and unique conclusions. 
 All the random terms are unobservable prior to making the quality production decisions. The effort xi is 
costly, and C
/(x) and C
// > 0. The separation of the error term into idiosyncratic and common components 
will be important for the rank-order tournament contract analysis. 
 
The Marketing Loan Program (MLP) operation is also simplified in order to focus on its most 
important aspects. There are two periods. During period one, harvest sales of the crop occur in a free spot 
market. If the equilibrium price at harvest is anything below the marketing loan rate (the price floor), the 
growers effectively get the marketing loan rate (MLR) for their crop, because they are entitled to the 
deficiency payment from the government, which is the difference between the MLR and the sale price. 
Any quality premiums included in the harvest sale price do not affect the final receipt of the MLR, as 
soon as the sale price remains below it.  
According to the stated MLP rules, the sale prices at harvest determine the loan repayment rate 
(LRR) effective during the second period – the post harvest market which, in case of peanuts, lasts for 9 
months, and during which the crop can be deposited by the growers in the government warehouses as 
collateral for the exogenous (pre-fixed) Marketing Loan Rate. During this period, the crop can be 
redeemed by the growers at anytime at the current LRR and sold to the processors. If LRR<MLR (the 
prevailing situation), the producers also receive deficiency payment DP=MLR-LRR. Alternatively, the 
loan crop can be forfeited at no cost, again leaving the producers with the price floor of MLR.  
The important feature of this model of government support is that the prices at harvest (period 
one prices) determine the after-harvest (period two) prices, which corresponds to the actual method that 
the government uses. (Actually, the repayment rate setting rule is equating the LRR to the current 
country-level prices that are updated on a weekly basis. In the final version of the model, we will 
accommodate this more realistically by assuming a separate subgame during the post-harvest period.) The 
important conclusion from this is that, when the market prices do not beat the MLR (which is the case 
most of the time), the only way for the producers to get more than the price floor (MLR) is to sell during 
post-harvest period at the price greater than the LRR and later collect the deficiency payment DP=MLR-
LRR, leaving them with gross revenue that is greater than the price floor.  
  Below, we describe the models of fixed premium quality standards and rank order tournament 
contracts and their solutions. The section is followed by a discussion of the results. 
 
Case 1: Fixed Quality Premium Standards 
With the fixed quality premium contracts, the processors pay the growers fixed quality premiums 
regardless their ranking relative to each other. Defining w as an addition to the “base” price of the crop 
(think about it as the per unit price for the crop with minimal acceptable quality), and r as the premium 
per unit of quality (which, in case of peanuts, is measured mainly in aflatoxin content), the competitive 
processor’s problem is to pick w and r that maximize the grower’s expected utility: 
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where   and  ) (x C rq w y − + = ) (y θ  is the p.d.f. of the grower’s income y. 
  The grower’s problem is to choose the level of effort put in crop quality to maximize expected 
utility given w and r: 
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, which results (assuming interior solution) in 
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This condition is identical to the risk-neutral case, as the error terms are independent of the effort level.  
  The zero-market revenue constraint for the processor (perfect competition) is that the expected 
revenue from selling the crop processing output is equal to the expected crop cost: rx w Px + = .            ( 3 )  
Substituting this into the grower income equation, the optimum contract maximizes  
∫∫ − + + dedv e f r x C rv re r Px U ) ( ))) ( ( ) ( (  
with respect to r, and where x=x(r) satisfies (2). 
  Simplifying the marginal condition leads to 
  0 ] [ )] ( [ = ′ + ′ + ′ ′ − U Ev U Ee U E
dr
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x C P        ( 4 )  
Since risk aversion implies EeU
/ + EvU
/ < 0, P > C
/(x) in the optimum contract for risk-averse 
growers. It is obvious that the resulting allocation is inferior to the one that would result in a model of 
risk-averse crop growers, in which case the marginal cost of producer effort would equal its social return: 
P=C
/(x). From the social point of view, risk-aversion leads to underinvestment in comparison to a risk-
neutral case, which is a manifestation of moral hazard resulting from insurance w>0 and r<P implied by 
(4).  
Using second order Taylor series approximation of the grower’s utility function and normal 
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where  U
U s ′ ′
′ =  is the absolute risk aversion evaluated at the mean income. Clearly, the optimum r is 
identified by (2) and w by (3). Both optimal effort xi and r are increasing in V and decreasing in s and σe,v
2. 
 
Now consider the incentives that introduction of fixed quality premiums/differentials create for 
post-harvest market participation under the Marketing Loan Program (MLP) operation. For simplicity, 
imagine only two growers whose crop qualities differ. If the growers know the premium schedule (w and 
r) and can observe each other’s crop qualities (or price offers from processors), the lower quality grower 
is indifferent between selling at harvest and entering the MLP and then either selling after harvest or not 
selling at all, as  the Marketing Loan Rate (MLR) is guaranteed by the program design. However, it is 
optimal for the higher quality grower to sell his crop during the post-harvest (second) period for the 
following reason. In period one (at-harvest market), the worse quality grower sells his crop at a lower 
quality premium, which automatically sets the post-harvest loan repayment rate (LRR) at this price (see 
the explanation of the MLP operation above). The higher quality grower will thus receive the LRR plus 
the premium for better quality plus the deficiency payment (DP=MLR-LRR), leaving him with more than 
the price floor even when the processors’ demand/offer price is below it. It can be shown that the same 
incentives for post-harvest spot market sales exist in a more complicated model (i.e., with multiple 
heterogeneous growers, for example).  
  Another important implication of imposing the Marketing Loan Program (MLP) operation on the 
model is that the guaranteed price floor (the MLR) reduces incentives to invest in crop quality. This can 
readily be incorporated in the fixed quality premium model above showing that the privately (but not 
socially) optimal level of xi will be smaller.
6 In general, however, it will still be non-negative, which will 
                                                 
6 An interesting corollary of this observation is that these inefficiencies can actually “thicken” the at-harvest (period 
one) market. For example, it can be shown that, with heterogeneous producers, the ones with higher cost of effort 
may not exert any effort at all, leading to more sales happening in the first period. However, it is difficult to judge 
whether the increased efficiency of thicker markets (resulting from more efficient price discovery) would offset the preserve the incentives for the post-harvest market participation. The general conclusion is that, while the 
fixed quality premium contracts encourage participation in the post-harvest spot markets, producer risk 
aversion and the presence of the MLP lead to allocative inefficiencies.  
  
 
Case 2: Rank-Order Tournaments 
As a measure that can partially remedy the lack of incentives to invest in crop quality under 
grower risk aversion, we consider an alternative contract design – a tournament crop contract structure – 
in which the quality premiums depend on the relative positions/performances of the crop growers. So far, 
tournament contracts have been successfully applied only in the U.S. poultry and meat markets (Vukina et 
al., 2001, Roe et al., …). 
For simplicity, we assume two identical growers – a case that can easily be generalized to 
multiple growers and, with some effort, extended to the case of heterogeneous producers. As above, the 
crop processors are assumed to be competitive, with a fixed coefficients production function, and facing 
fixed output demand that pays P per unit of quality. In this modeling exercise, we abstract from the 
“base” price w using the simplified processing output demand specifications, which does not affect the 
generality of the results, as it does not affect the optimal producer effort. 
Unlike with the fixed quality premium standards, the rules here specify a fixed prize V1 to the 
winner and a fixed prize V2 < V1 to the loser, the winner being determined by the largest crop quality qi 
(i=1,2). The notation is as in the Case 1. It is assumed that the growers can not collude, which is realistic. 
The model determines the competitive price/prize structure (V1, V2) offered by the processors, and the 
optimal levels of effort exerted by the growers. 
A grower’s expected utility function is  
) ( ) 1 ( ))} ( ( ){ 1 ( ))} ( ( { 2 1 2 1 x C V z zV x C V U z x C V U z − − + = − − + − ,     (7) 
where z is the probability of “wining” the contest. 
  The probability that player i wins is 
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where  j k e e − = ξ ,  ) ( ~ ξ ξ g , G(.) is the c.d.f. of  . It is very important to note that the 
common shock, v (the common yield risk), does not affect the probability of winning the tournament. 
This observation is crucial for the conclusions that follow. 
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  Each player chooses xi to maximize (8). Assuming interior solutions, this implies  
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We (realistically) adopt the Nash-Cournot assumption that each grower optimizes against the optimum 
effort of the opponent, taking it as given. For grower j then 















substituting which into (9) yields the j’s reaction function 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 = ′ − − − j k j x C x x g V V         ( 1 0 )  
                                                                                                                                                             
efficiency losses from lower effort. Accounting for the price floor will introduce some discontinuities and may 
require using numerical solution techniques. and an identical function for the other grower. 
  Symmetry (identical growers) implies that, when the Nash solution exists, xj=xk and z=G(0)=1/2, 
so the outcome is purely random in equilibrium.
7 Ex ante, however, each producer/grower affects the 
probability of winning by exerting effort.   
  (Assuming, for a moment, risk averse growers yields an illustrative result that, with equal 
equilibrium efforts, (10) reduces to 
) 0 ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 g V V x C − = ′            ( 1 1 )    
for each grower, signifying that the equilibrium efforts are determined by the spread spread between 
quality premiums (winning and losing prizes). The magnitude of the premiums only affects the decision 
to exert effort, which requires non-negativity of its expected benefit.) 
  The risk-neutral crop processor’s (crop buyer’s) gross receipts are (xj+xk)P, and the costs are the 
total of the quality premiums offered: V1+V2.  Competition for inputs results in equality of expected 
receipts and costs:  
V1 + V2 = (xj + xk)P  
which, given symmetry, reduces to a zero-profit constraint  
  x
*P = (V1 + V2)/ 2 ,           (12) 
i.e., the expected value of quality equals the expected premium at the equilibrium. 
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subject to (12). 
  The growers’ behavior can be described by  
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and the optimum tournament contract maximizes 
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subject to (12) and (15). Increasing marginal cost of investment and risk aversion guarantees a unique 
maximum when a Nash solution exists.  
Using second order Taylor series approximation of the grower’s utility function and normal 
densities for ei and v, the optimum effort under the tournament contract is approximated by 
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7 The purely random outcome is a result of assuming identical growers. Assuming heterogeneous producers will 
make it less random, but preserve the nature of the incentives. Besides, it is the random feature that is important in 
the tournament/contest analysis. Identical growers are assumed for simplicity of exposition. It is important to note the absence of the variance in the common shock tem x in (17) and (18), which 
contrasts with (5) and (6). The intuition behind is that the common shock (interpreted as common/weather 
related yield risk) does not affect the ordinal ranking of the producers/growers and thus does not affect 
their effort in improving crop quality.  
  It is easy to see that the logic of encouraging after-harvest spot market sales by the growers 
described in Case 1 applies to the tournament compensation scheme as well. The more efficient growers 
have an incentive (self-select) to enter the Marketing Loan Program (MLP) with a view of selling their 
crop in the post-harvest period, after the loan repayment rates have been set on the basis of the at-harvest 
season prices of inferior quality crop grown by producers who do not have incentives to participate in the 
MLP. As was argued before, this result is in striking contrast with the virtual (and empirically observed) 
absence of the post-harvest spot/cash market in the absence of quality differentials, which has been 
largely a consequence of the Marketing Loan Program design.  
  Also, as was noted in Case 1, the presence of the price floor (marketing loan rate) provided by the 
MLP may serve as an additional deterrent from applying effort to improve crop quality. At this time, it is 
enough to observe that, while the effects of a price floor on the producer incentives are the same in both 
cases, rank-order tournament contracts encourage more effort ceteris paribus and thus lead to more 





The model above shows that allocations that result from both the fixed premium and tournament 
contracts lie in between the two extremes: the socially optimal allocation when crop growers are risk 
neutral ( ) and the actual absence of quality differentials that induces minimum quality.  ) (
* x C P ′ =
  Considering the fact that, because both individual and common yield risks can not be completely 
diversified in order to attain the first-best, optimal tournament contract design offers the second-best, 
which in many cases is superior to the fixed quality premium contracts. Comparison of the equilibrium 
grower efforts under the two contract structures given by equations (5) and (17) shows that, if the 
common producer/yield risk (variable v) is sufficiently large, crop growers may prefer tournament 
contracts to fixed quality premium schedules. The sufficient condition for this is  
π σ σ σ
2 2 2 ) ( e v e > +  
which, when observed, results in higher expected utility under the tournament scheme that can be verified 
by finding the optimal w, r, and (V1, V2) in the model above. 
Obviously, when the common production shock, v, is sufficiently diffuse (i.e.,   is large 
enough), producers will prefer tournament contracts. This is consistent with findings of Green and Stokey 
(1983) for labor markets and Tsoulohas and Vukina (2001) for the U.S. poultry industry, but contradicts 
the general results of Lazear and Rosen (1981) who did not consider common shocks in their model. The 
intuition behind this result is that, while all production risks matter equally to the producers under the 
fixed premium standards, only idiosyncratic risks affect random ranking under tournament contracts, 
which reduces the overall uncertainty and encourages more effort. This is confirmed by comparing the 
equilibrium income variability under the two regimes given by equations (6) and (18). The sufficient 
condition for the grower income to be more stable under tournaments is  
2
v σ
) ) ( 1 ( 1
2 2 2 2 C s C s v e e e ′ ′ + + > ′ ′ + σ σ πσ π σ , 
which holds when the variance of the common shock,  , is sufficiently larger than that of the producer 
specific disturbance. Thus, the tournament contracts efficiently shift part of the production risks from the 
risk-averse growers to risk neutral producers. Speaking of the actual situation, it is worth pointing out 
that, under the U.S. Marketing Loan Program, the loan repayment rates are set equal to county level spot 
2
v σmarket prices, which emphasizes the importance of the common (weather and decease) risks, thus 
favoring tournament contracts.   
All in all, the (preliminary) analysis suggests that the absence of quality differentials has 
detrimental effect on economic efficiency in markets for quality differentiated products, which can be 
improved by introduction of producer-processor contracts that specify quality premiums. Barring the first-
best allocation under grower risk aversion, optimal tournament design brings the market closer to the 
socially optimal allocation than the more standard fixed quality premium contracts. 
We believe that these results will not change after introducing producer heterogeneity, which is 
planned for the final version of the paper. Heterogeneous producers will certainly choose different effort 
levels but, when their individual characteristics are unobservable by the crop buyers, the superiority of the 
tournament scheme will remain. Producer heterogeneity may also introduce adverse selection, which can 
be ameliorated at the expense of efficiency as suggested in previous research. 
 
After-Harvest Spot Market Participation 
Another important result of this analysis is that introduction of quality premiums encourages 
producer participation in the post-harvest spot/cash market sales. This is an important consideration, 
given the virtual absence of such markets in the U.S. peanut production after the 2002 Farm Act that 
introduced the Marketing Loan Program. The analysis of fixed quality premiums and tournaments showed 
that both create incentives for higher quality producers to enter the Marketing Loan Program. This is 
because selling the crop to processors in post-harvest spot/cash markets guarantees revenue that is higher 
than the loan rate.  
It was noted that the presence of the price floor provided by the MLP serves as a deterrent from 
applying effort to improve crop quality. However, while the effects of a price floor on the producer 
incentives are the same in both cases 1 and 2, rank-order tournament contracts encourage more effort 
ceteris paribus and thus lead to more efficient allocation, even under the above mentioned constraint. 
This aspect is not explicitly considered in the current version of the model but will be incorporated in its 
final version of the paper.  
  In the final version of the paper, we also plan to consider the sequential aspect of tournaments, as 
well as a dynamic aspect of the post-harvest producer marketing decisions.  
 
Marketing Loan Program Costs 
The existence of a post-harvest spot market is essential not only for efficient price discovery 
(equilibration of supply and demand), but also for the costs of the Marketing Loan Program operation that 
are born by the taxpayers. By providing incentives to withdraw the crop from the loan program, a system 
of quality premiums (either tournament-based or fixed) discourages the common behavior of forfeiting 
the marketing loan by many producers. So far, this behavior has resulted in the government having to 
dispose of vast quantities of peanuts at the end of the year (at grossly inferior prices) as peanuts are a 
semi-storable commodity and may not be suitable for edible purposes after a year of storage. By 
expanding (”thickening”) the post-harvest spot market, the suggested contractual arrangements provide 
more precise reference point for establishing the program repayment rate, which is in accord with the 
declared program’s objectives.  
While the program costs are not discussed at length in the current version of the paper, it should 
be noted that accounting for them does not change the crop grower contract preferences, as soon as the 
rules of the program and the price floor (the loan rate) remain the same. However, departure from the 
stated repayment rate setting rule and more direct pursuit of the program cost minimization may affect the 
optimal contract design and overall efficiency. 
 
The Role of Forward Contracts 
As was mentioned in the introduction, most of the peanut crop under the loan program is 
currently tied in the so-called “option-to-buy”, or “buyer’s call” contracts that leave the timing of 
purchase to the contractor (processor) and specify the selling price to be equal to current loan repayment rate. A peculiar fact is that these contracts are prevalent in the majority of the U.S. crop markets under the 
Marketing Loan Program (Sykuta, 2004). It has been suggested that crop growers do not mind ceding 
their marketing rights because these contracts pay an “option” premium in excess of the guaranteed 
marketing loan rate. Several reasons for offering these contracts have also been suggested, ranging from 
improvements in supply management and efficient risk sharing to exercising market power by collusive 
processors (MacDonald et al., 2004). In case of the market power motivation, a simple model can be 
constructed that shows that the “buyer’s call” contracts can, at least in theory, substantially increase the 
costs of the marketing loan program, unless the government officials have a superior bargaining power 
vis-à-vis crop processing industries. 
While the actual costs and benefits of these contracts still have to estimated, it is of interest to 
consider alternative marketing arrangements that may be preferred by agricultural producers. The model 
specified in this paper suggests that, if the expected net gains from selling the crop in the post-harvest 
spot market exceed the existing contract’s “option” premium, producers of quality differentiated crops 
will prefer spot transactions (either tournaments or fixed standards) that specify quality premiums.  
 
Alternative Assumptions about Crop Processors 
  Current version of the model presented in the paper assumes competitive and risk-averse 
processors. Obviously, hardly any economic agent is completely risk-averse, and so are the crop 
processors. However, what matters for the results of out contract analysis is the relative risk aversion of 
processors and growers – as soon as the former are less risk averse than the latter, the ordinal results will 
remain the same. Theoretically, small independent crop processors may be more risk averse than large 
and diversified farmers. In practice, however, even processors operating on a small scale usually belong 
to much larger companies with well diversified activities, which raises concerns about imperfect 
competition.  
In the U.S. peanut processing, for example, almost 73 percent of the crop is bought by two major 
peanut shelling companies, which has raised concerns about the nature of competition in the sector. The 
possibility of imperfect competition can be accommodated in the model by assuming profit maximizing 
firms that behave collusively. Existing contract literature suggests that tournaments may still be socially 






  In the paper, analysis and suggested solutions are presented for some important issues of several 
U.S. markets for raw agricultural commodities that have recently experienced a significant policy change. 
Introduction of the 2002 Farm Act dealt away with the former supply management policies in the form of 
the quota system that fixed production prices and quantities and replaced them with the Marketing 
Assistance Loan Program that does not impose production quotas but provides a price floor for producers. 
Markets for sugar, tobacco, and peanuts experienced this change for the first time. In this paper, we focus 
on the U.S. peanut market as an appropriate example.  
During the transition period, two major issues have been observed in this market. First, because 
of the marketing loan program peculiarities, virtually no cash market existed in the post-harvest period. 
This resulted in market inefficiency and in an awkward situation in which crop processors often had to 
buy their inputs almost directly from the government that held the marketing loan stock. Besides, 
contractual arrangements with unclear welfare consequences have dominated the market. Second, crop 
contracts between producers and processors do not account for crop quality differences, which has raised 
concerns as peanuts, unlike many other crops, is a crop that is highly differentiated in terms of its 
aflatoxin content, maturity, and taste characteristics. This situation is largely a legacy of the quota system 
that fixed prices and did not encourage market efficiency. In an attempt to address these issues, we model the efficiency and distributional effects of 
introduction of two types of alternative contractual arrangements between crop growers and processors: 
fixed quality premium and tournament contracts. The analysis showed that both contracts create strong 
incentives for higher quality producers to sell the crop in the post-harvest spot/cash markets, as it 
guarantees revenue that is higher than the loan rate. By providing growers with incentives to withdraw the 
crop from the loan program, a system of quality premiums (either tournament-based or fixed) discourages 
the common behavior of forfeiting the marketing loan by many producers. 
In terms of improving market efficiency, the analysis suggests that the current absence of quality 
differentials/premiums has detrimental effect on economic efficiency in markets for quality differentiated 
products, which can be improved by introduction of producer-processor contracts that specify quality 
premiums. Barring the first-best allocation under grower risk aversion, optimal tournament design brings 
the market closer to the socially optimal allocation than the more standard fixed quality premium 
contracts. This is due to the presence of uncertainty, particularly large common production shocks 
experienced on a county scale. 
The model also shows that, by expanding (”thickening”) the post-harvest spot market, the 
suggested contractual arrangements provide more precise reference point for establishing the program 
repayment rate, which is in accord with the declared program’s objectives.  
The suggested contracts can eventually crowd out the currently prevalent “buyer’s call” contracts: 
if the expected net gains from selling the crop in the post-harvest spot market exceed the existing current 
contracts’ “option” premium, producers of quality differentiated crops will prefer spot transactions that 
specify quality premiums (tournaments more will be preferred to fixed standards).  
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